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Understanding	populism:	What	role	do	crises	play	in
the	growth	of	Euroscepticism?
Three	distinct	crises	have	hit	the	European	Union	in	the	last	decade:	the	Great	Recession,	the
migration	crisis,	and	Brexit.	As	Andrea	L.	P.	Pirro	explains,	there	has	been	a	widespread	assumption
that	populist	parties	with	Eurosceptic	profiles	have	been	the	main	political	beneficiaries	from	these
crises.	But	there	still	remains	much	to	be	understood	about	what	populists	make	out	of	such	crises,	as
well	as	their	impact	on	Euroscepticism.
The	waking	of	the	populist	giant	has	become	a	contemporary	mantra.	Since	the	breakout	of	the	Great	Recession,
non-academic	observers	have	often	subscribed	to	alarmist	views	regarding	a	populist	backlash	in	advanced
democracies.	But	various	kinds	of	populist	forces	have	in	fact	become	permanent	fixtures	of	European	party	systems
over	the	past	two	decades,	suggesting	a	more	balanced	outlook	on	the	relationship	between	populism	and	‘crisis’	is
called	for.
A	recent	cross-national	study	covering	17	European	countries	has	already	cast	doubt	on	the	notion	of	clear	and
homogenous	elements	propelling	the	fortunes	of	populist	parties	in	the	shadow	of	the	Great	Recession.	And	yet,
addressing	crises	as	mere	background	conditions	seems	to	tell	us	little	about	what	populists	actually	make	out	of
such	crises.	A	forthcoming	special	issue	of	Politics,	guest-edited	by	Paul	Taggart,	Stijn	van	Kessel,	and	myself,
specifically	delves	into	the	relationship	between	populism,	Euroscepticism,	and	crisis.
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The	unfolding	of	the	Great	Recession,	the	migrant	crisis,	and	Brexit	posed	serious	challenges	to	the	European	status
quo	and	the	integration	model	propounded	by	EU	elites.	The	specific	breadth	of	these	crises	nonetheless	offers
important	opportunities	for	students	of	populism.	First,	they	helped	elevate	the	concept	of	crisis	to	a	central
component	in	the	analysis	of	populist	discourse.	What	better	occasion	to	bring	‘crises’	back	into	the	analysis	of
populism	than	a	prolonged	period	of	crisis?	Second,	by	making	reference	to	crises	that	are	European	in	character
and	scope,	we	could	see	how	opposition	to	supranational	elites	fits	into	the	discourse	of	crisis	articulated	by	populist
collective	actors.	In	essence,	we	could	monitor	the	evolution	of	populist	Eurosceptic	discourses	as	these	crises
unfolded.	The	underlying	assumption	is	that,	in	the	face	of	the	recent	European	crises,	anti-establishment	forces
might	have	an	extra	incentive	to	harden	their	Euroscepticism	and,	thus,	blame	the	European	elites	on	the	basis	of	a
composite	(i.e.	broader)	set	of	arguments.
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A	first	enquiry	into	the	populist	radical	right’s	stances	on	‘Europe’	showed	no	uniform	reactions	to	the	Great
Recession.	Taken	together,	populist	radical	right	parties	did	not	unanimously	advocate	withdrawal	from	the	single
currency,	nor	the	EU.	While	most	parties	were	indeed	seen	to	harden	their	Eurosceptic	stances,	very	few	went	as	far
as	advocating	exit	from	the	EU.	Most	notably,	however,	the	economic	and	financial	crises	prompted	members	of	this
party	family	to	move	beyond	their	cultural	framing	of	European	integration	and	centre	their	criticism	(also)	on
socioeconomic	arguments.	By	shifting	the	focus	on	the	broader	set	of	(left-wing,	centrist,	and	right-wing)	populist
parties,	and	extending	our	enquiry	to	all	three	crises,	we	could	a)	see	how	the	EU	is	used	in	the	critical	and
oppositional	discourse	of	populist	actors;	and	b)	establish	if	and	how	these	discourses	have	reverberated	across	the
party-political	arena.
The	varying	nature	of	the	crises	reflected	differently	on	the	populist	framings	of	‘Europe’.	Populists	criticised	the	EU
for	the	harmful	socioeconomic	consequences	of	austerity;	the	threat	to	national	sovereignty,	security,	or	cultural
homogeneity	posed	by	non-EU	migrants;	the	upholding	of	a	distant	and	undemocratic	system	of	governance;	or	a
combination	of	the	above.
The	different	crises	thus	expanded	the	range	of	Eurosceptic	frames	typically	employed	by	populist	parties,	allowing
them	to	intensify	or	highlight	their	Eurosceptic	arguments	and	to	adapt	their	framing	of	European	integration	as	each
crisis	unfolded	(see	the	table	below	for	a	categorisation	of	populist	Eurosceptic	frames).	Even	so,	left-wing	populists
preserved	the	socioeconomic	framing	of	their	Euroscepticism.	Conversely,	the	Great	Recession	offered	right-wing
populists	the	opportunity	to	elaborate	on	similar	discourses,	only	to	return	to	a	cultural	framing	of	Euroscepticism	at
the	peak	of	the	migration	crisis.	The	M5S	in	Italy	had	been	one	case	of	a	populist	party	flirting	with	cultural	framings
beyond	clearer	left-wing	and	right-wing	ideological	distinctions.
Table:	Populist	Eurosceptic	frame	categorisation
Source:	Pirro	and	Van	Kessel	(2018)
In	terms	of	impact,	the	mainstream	remained	remarkably	resilient	against	populist	Euroscepticism.	The	cases	of
higher	impact	had	been	those	most	affected	by	the	economic	crisis,	or	Brexit	–	as	in	the	case	of	the	UK.	In	these
cases,	populist	Eurosceptics	had	been	either	able	to	instigate	competition	on	‘Europe’	or	leave	a	mark	by	means	of
the	specific	weight	gained	within	respective	party	systems	(e.g.	Portugal	and	Spain).
Although	the	three	crises	helped	increase	the	relevance	of	European	affairs	in	public	debates,	we	should	not	be	too
quick	to	assume	that	the	EU	and	European	integration	have	automatically	turned	into	the	central	battleground	for
political	contestation.	This	holds	for	populists	and	non-populists	alike,	who	still	fall	short	of	placing	‘Europe’	at	the
core	of	their	concerns.	As	a	result,	we	should	not	uncritically	treat	the	advancements	of	populist	Eurosceptic	forces
as	a	metric	of	public	disenchantment	with	the	EU.	Instead,	we	should	treat	them	as	an	ever-louder	alarm	signalling
growing	fatigue	with	traditional	parties	and	established	politics,	which	may	have	proven	to	be	unprepared,	or	unfit,	to
respond	to	the	serious	challenges	posed	by	multiple	crises.
This	article	first	appeared	on	EUROPP	–	European	Politics	and	Policy.	It	represents	the	views	of	the	authors	and	not
those	of	the	Brexit	blog,	nor	the	LSE.
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Andrea	L.	P.	Pirro	is	a	Postdoctoral	Research	Fellow	at	the	Department	of	Political	and	Social	Sciences,	Scuola
Normale	Superiore.	He	is	the	author	of	The	Populist	Radical	Right	in	Central	and	Eastern	Europe:	Ideology,	Impact,
and	Electoral	Performance	(Routledge,	2015)	and	has	edited	three	special	issues.
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